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From an economic perspective, dynamic pricing 
seems to be the profit maximizing pricing strategy for 
consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing platforms 
because it allows balancing supply and demand over 
time. Based on distributive justice and equity theory we 
investigate how two characteristics of dynamic pricing, 
namely ‘fee changes over time’ and ‘fee differences 
across consumer groups’, influence fairness perception 
and intention to share of consumers. Using a laboratory 
experiment, we find that fee differences between lenders 
and borrowers is the dominant source of negative 
fairness perception, which in turn results in a lower 
intention to share, especially for the consumer group 
that is charged with a higher fee. Consequently, C2C 
sharing platforms have to be aware of this negative 
effect from fairness perception when they implement a 




1. Introduction  
 
The consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing 
ecosystem is characterized by three classes of 
participants (cf., [8]). Lenders are consumers that own 
products and grant other consumers temporary access to 
these products by charging a sharing price. Borrowers 
are consumers that do not own products, but aim to get 
temporary access to products by paying the sharing 
price to lenders. C2C sharing platforms are 
accessibility-based systems that provide a matchmaking 
service (e.g., listings of products, consumer ratings, 
payment services, etc.) facilitating sharing transactions 
between lenders and borrowers [3]. The majority of C2C 
sharing platforms such as Airbnb.com, 9Flats.com, 
Wimdu.com and Zilok.com charge platform fees to 
lenders and/or borrowers for using their matchmaking 
service (cf., [16]) to maximize profits. These fees are 
usually set constant over time but subsidize either 
lenders or borrowers over the respective other group 
(e.g., Airbnb.com charge a fee to lenders of 3% and a 
fee to borrower 5-15% of the total sharing price of an 
apartment) [9]. 
From traditional one-sided markets, sophisticated 
pricing strategies are known where prices are adapted in 
response to periodic demand fluctuations and inventory 
levels [10] or changing environmental conditions [21]. 
For example, airlines distinguish consumers according 
to their price sensitivity [29] or soft drink vendors tried 
to adjust prices according to the surrounding 
temperature [21]. Such pricing strategies are 
summarized by the term dynamic pricing and can be 
seen as a variation of traditional price discrimination 
[17]. Dynamic pricing is generally defined as “a pricing 
strategy in which prices change over time, across 
consumers, or across product/service bundles” [20, p. 
63]. For the majority of C2C sharing platforms, the latter 
is of minor interest because there is typically no 
differentiation in the provided matchmaking service. 
Subsequently, we focus on fee changes over time and 
fee differences across consumer groups (in our context 
across lenders and borrowers) in the context of dynamic 
two-sided platform pricing in C2C sharing platforms. 
Please note that we are analyzing dynamic two-sided 
platform pricing (i.e., dynamically changing platform 
fees over time that may differ between lenders and 
borrowers) which could be applied for the majority of 
C2C sharing platforms such as Airbnb.com, 9Flats.com, 
Wimdu.com and Zilok.com that do not set the sharing 






price (i.e. the sharing price is set by the lender). 
Consequently, we do not analyze dynamically changing 
sharing prices, which is a pricing strategy applied by 
Uber.com (called surge pricing). Uber.com is 
substantially different to the C2C sharing platforms 
mentioned above as Uber.com also sets the sharing price 
and dynamically adjusts it to eliminate imbalance of 
supply and demand [32]. 
Angerer et al. [3] show that from an economic 
perspective C2C sharing platforms are profit 
maximizing only if supply for a product on a C2C 
sharing platform equals demand (cleared market). This 
market clearing condition can be maintained by 
dynamically adjusting platform fees over time and 
across lenders and borrowers. 
Although, such a dynamic pricing strategy might be 
profit maximizing from a pure economic perspective, it 
might at the same time cause negative effects on 
intention to share due to a negative fairness perception 
of consumers [27] which is indicated by theories such as 
distributive justice [18] and equity theory [2].  
In extant literature, the effect of dynamic pricing on 
fairness perception and purchase intention have been 
studied for traditional industries with one-sided pricing 
models. Thereby, differences in fairness perception 
predominantly results from price changes over time by 
consumers that compare own prices with prices that 
have been paid by former consumers for the same 
product [14, 22]. These studies conclude that dynamic 
pricing significantly affects fairness perception [22] in 
a negative way because it causes uncertainties [17] or 
violates established pricing norms [13]. The negative 
effect on fairness perception is getting lager the higher 
the price changes over time are [14]. It is also well 
established that consumers “are willing to resist unfair 
firms even at a positive cost” [19, p. 285]. Thus, 
purchase intention of consumers is significantly affected 
by fairness perception [23]. In more detail, purchase 
intention is positively related to fairness perception [5, 
13, 19, 33, 34]. However, in two-sided platform 
businesses such as the sharing economy, consumers can 
not only compare their platform fees with platform fees 
of former consumers. They can also compare their 
platform fees with platform fees of their transaction 
partner. How fee changes over time and fee differences 
between lenders and borrowers affect fairness 
perception and consequently intention to share have not 
been studied so far. Accordingly, we state the following 
research question: 
 
How does dynamic pricing of a C2C sharing 
platform influence the fairness perception and 
intention to share of consumers? 
 
To answer this research question we conducted a 
laboratory experiment using a 3x4 within-subject full 
factorial design. We use the independent variables fee 
differences across consumer groups with three 
manipulations and fee changes over time with four 
manipulations to test the effect of dynamic pricing on 
the mediating variable fairness perception and the effect 
of fairness perception on the dependent variable 
intention to share. During the experiment the 
independent variable fee differences across consumer 
groups is manipulated in a way that the fee of the 
participant is the same, higher or lower than the fee of 
the transaction partner with whom the participant is 
sharing a product. The independent variable fee changes 
over time is manipulated in a way that no fee changed in 
the past, only the fee of the participant changed in the 
past, only the fee of the transaction partner changed in 
the past, or both fees changed in the past. 
We find that fee changes over time as well as fee 
differences across consumer groups have a negative 
effect on fairness perception and intention to share. 
Comparing the effect sizes, fee differences across 
consumer groups have a substantially higher negative 
effect on fairness perception than fee changes over time. 
Especially the consumer group that is charged with a 
higher fee has a lower intention to share resulting from 
negative fairness perception. Consequently, C2C 
sharing platforms have to be aware, especially of the 
negative effects resulting from fee differences between 
lenders and borrowers on fairness perception when they 
implement a dynamic two-sided pricing strategy. 
Overall, C2C sharing platforms have to balance the 
positive economic effect described in [3] and the 
negative effect of fairness perception on intention to 
share. 
 
2. Theoretical background and research 
model 
 
Our research is informed by the theory of 
distributive justice and equity theory. “Both equity 
theory and distributive justice suggest that perception of 
fairness are induced when a person compares an 
outcome […] with a comparative other’s outcome” [34, 
p. 1]. Distributive justice explains “the allocation of 
rewards on the basis of individual contributions to an 
exchange relationship” [7, p. 265] and states that “a 
man's rewards in exchange with others should be 
proportional to his investments” [18, p. 235]. Equity 
theory states that equity exists for a person “whenever 
he perceives that the ratio of his outcomes to inputs and 
the ratio of other’s outcomes to other’s inputs” are equal 
[2, p. 280]. 
In both theories, a situation is considered as fair 
when the compared parties get the same rewards to their 
investments [31] and as unfair when a discrepancy 
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appears in the comparison [7]. According to [34] 
distributive justice focuses on the comparison of parties 
that are involved in the same transaction and equity 
theory broadens this focus to a comparison of parties 
that are not necessarily in the same transaction. 
In our research model depicted in Figure 1, we 
follow the distinction of [34] and use distributive justice 
and equity theory to hypothesize the effects of the 
independent variables fee changes over time and fee 
differences across consumer groups on the mediating 
variable fairness perception that in turn affects our 
dependent variable intention to share. 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
Contemporary C2C sharing platforms charge fees to 
lenders and/or borrowers where typically either the 
lender or borrower is advantaged over the other in terms 
of the level of fee they have to pay for the matchmaking 
service the C2C sharing platform provides. In other 
words, one consumer group (i.e., lenders or borrowers) 
have to pay a lower fee for the matchmaking service of 
the C2C sharing platform than the other. Treating the 
matchmaking service of the C2C sharing platform as a 
reward that is equal for lenders and borrowers and 
considering the respective lender and borrower fee as 
their individual investment to use the matchmaking 
service, fee differences across consumer groups will 
result in a deviation from an equal ratio of reward to 
investment for lenders and borrowers. As we focus on 
C2C sharing platforms where the sharing price is set by 
the lender and not by the platform (e.g., Airbnb.com), 
we do neither consider further investments of borrowers 
(e.g., room charge, cleaning fee) and lenders (e.g., 
maintenance costs) nor additional rewards of borrowers 
(e.g., quality of the room) and lenders (e.g., room 
charge, cleaning fee) that are captured in the sharing 
price. Thus, our focus is whether lenders and borrowers 
perceive the platform fees as investment for using the 
matchmaking service provided by a C2C sharing 
platform as fair. 
In addition, consumers do also act in a self-interested 
way and thus perceive being disadvantaged less fair than 
being advantaged [34]. However, there is some evidence 
that “being advantaged is not always considered the 
fairest” [33, p. 893]. As lenders and borrowers are 
involved in the same transaction [34], we use 
distributive justice to hypothesize that fee differences 
between lenders and borrowers reduce fairness 
perception [7, 18, 31]. We expect that fee differences 
across consumer groups of a joint sharing transaction 
have a negative effect on fairness perception. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Fee differences across consumer groups have a 
negative effect on fairness perception. 
 
Angerer et al. [3] propose that C2C sharing 
platforms should dynamically adjust its lender and 
borrower fee over time in order to preserve the clear 
market condition and subsequently be profit 
maximizing. In accordance to equity theory also past 
sharing transactions of both lenders and borrowers are 
within the scope of comparison. For example, a lender 
who has repeatedly shared an apartment via Airbnb.com 
may recognize that she has paid different platform fees 
over time for using the matchmaking service. Treating 
the matchmaking service of the C2C sharing platform as 
reward and the platform fees as investments, fee 
changes over time will result in a deviation from equal 
ratios of reward to investment when comparing past 
with current platform fees. In addition, fee changes over 
time may also cause uncertainties when estimating the 
outcome of a possible sharing transaction and in turn 
have a negative influence on fairness perception [17]. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that:  
 
H2: Fee changes over time have a negative effect on 
fairness perception. 
 
Consumers punish companies if they perceive their 
behavior as unfair [19] by spreading negative word of 
mouth, filing a complaint or searching for alternatives 
[13, 34]. Most literature evaluates the effect of 
perceived fairness with regard to purchase intention and 
conclude that fairness perception is positively related to 
purchase intention [5, 13, 19, 33, 34]. Thereby, purchase 
intention is seen “as a surrogate measure of actual 
purchase” [22, p. 544]. Although the effect of fairness 
perception on purchase intention was examined in the 
context of e-commerce and retailing (cf., [5, 13, 19, 33, 
34]), we expect the findings to be also applicable to the 
sharing economy. Thus, we substitute purchase 
intention by intention to share and expect a similar 
effect as for purchase intention. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3: Fairness perception has a positive effect on 
intention to share. 

















3. Research method and study design 
 
To test our hypothesis we conducted a laboratory 
experiment using a 3x4 within-subject full factorial 
design. The two independent variables are fee 
differences across consumer groups (three different 
manipulations) and fee changes over time (four different 
manipulations). Fairness perception is the mediating 
variable that mediates the effect of the independent 
variables on the dependent variable intention to share.  
 
3.1. Case description 
 
A sharing transaction provided by the C2C sharing 
platform Airbnb.com is used as a case example 
throughout the experiment. Airbnb.com is an 
accommodation-sharing platform that connects lenders 
who have an accommodation to share and borrowers 
who are willing to borrow an accommodation. Thereby, 
Airbnb.com is not the owner of the accommodation but 
rather provide the matchmaking service that allows 
lenders and borrowers to share an accommodation. We 
decided to use Airbnb.com as a case example, because 
the business model is commonly known and, unlike 
Uber.com, Airbnb.com follows the common pricing 
strategy of C2C sharing platforms (setting a lender 
and/or borrower fee for using the matchmaking service 
but not setting the sharing price). Therefore, we expect 
that our findings are applicable for the majority of C2C 
sharing platforms that follow the same pricing strategy. 
In our experiment, we created a scenario that consists of 
a mockup of a fictitious, available Airbnb apartment in 
Paris including a photo and a description. The 
participants that are randomly assigned to be a lender 
want to share this apartment for two days and the 
participants that are randomly assigned to be a borrower 
want to spend two holidays in Paris and borrow the 
apartment. If a sharing transaction is concluded (i.e., a 
borrower decides to borrow an accommodation from a 
lender), Airbnb.com charges platform fees to the lender 
and the borrower [1]. In our experiment, we deliberately 
manipulate these fees to investigate the effects on 
fairness perception and intention to share.  
 
3.2. Independent variables 
 
Dynamic two-sided pricing of a C2C sharing 
platform is represented by the two independent 
variables, fee differences across consumer groups and 
fee changes over time.  
Fee differences across consumer groups (f) is 
manipulated in three different ways: (A) equality, (B) 
disadvantaged inequality, and (C) advantaged 
inequality. In other words, the fee of the participant can 
be (A) the same, (B) higher, or (C) lower than the fee of 
the transaction partner. In the inequality treatments (B, 
and C), the fees are manipulated in a way that the fee 
differences between the transaction partners represent 
20% (as recommended by Blattberg et al. [4]). 
Fee changes over time (σ) is manipulated in four 
different ways: (1) equally stable, (2) disadvantaged-
dynamic, (3) advantaged-dynamic, and (4) equally 
dynamic. In other words, in (1) the fee of the participant 
and the fee of the transaction partner did not change in 
the past, (2) only the participant’s fee changed in the 
past, (3) only the transaction partner’s fee changed in the 
past, (4) both fees changed in the past. Combining the 
manipulations of the two independent variables in a full 
factorial design results in 12 treatments illustrated in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Experimental design 









σown = 0 




σown > 0 




σown = 0 




σown > 0 
σtp > 0 
(A) Equality 
fown = ftp 
A1 A2 A3 A4 
(B) Disadvantaged inequality 
 fown > ftp 
B1 B2 B3 B4 
(C) Advantaged inequality 
 fown < ftp 
C1 C2 C3 C4 
own  
tp   
f  
σ  
variables that are dedicated to the participant 
variables that are dedicated to the transaction partner of the participant 
fee differences across consumer groups 
fee changes over time 
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3.3. Mediating variable 
 
Besides economic effects of dynamic pricing on 
intention to share [3], fairness perception is considered 
to have a mediating effect between dynamic pricing and 
intention to share as well. Thus, fairness perception is 
considered as a mediating variable [22, 34]. In each 
treatment, the participants answer the question “How 
fair do you consider the fee you have to pay?”. 
Following Campbell [5], we use a single-item scale to 
measure the fairness perception a participant experience 
in each treatment. The answer “The fee I have to pay is 
fair” is measured on a seven-point Likert-scale with 
numbers from one to seven with end labelling of “totally 
disagree” and “totally agree”. Following the findings of 
Moors et al. [24], we choose an agreement scale (only 
positive numbers 1 to 7) instead of bipolar scale 
(positive and negative numbers -3 to +3) to avoid overly 
extreme responses. A high value (“totally agree”) 
indicates that a participant perceives the fee as fair while 
a low value (“totally disagree”) indicates that the fee is 
considered as unfair. 
 
3.4. Dependent variable 
 
We measure intention to share as likelihood that the 
participants are willing to share or borrow. Therefore, 
we ask the question “How likely would you 
[share/borrow] this apartment” and following Campbell 
[5], participants can answer on a single-item scale. In 
our experiment, the dependent variable intention to 
share is immediately measured after the mediating 
variable fairness perception. This can cause a risk of 
covariation when using the same scales for both items 
[26]. To counter this risk we use a different scale to 
measure intention to share. Thus, participants are asked 
to answer “My likelihood to [share/borrow] the 
apartment” on a slider-scale from 0 – 100 % where 
participants can choose their answer in ten percentage 
steps. A higher percentage rate on the scale indicates a 
higher intention to share. 
 
3.5. Control variables 
 
The C2C sharing economy consists of two consumer 
groups (lenders and borrowers). In our experiment, we 
randomly assigned participants to the two consumer 
groups. In order to avoid unintended effects from the 
assigned role, we control for these effects. We name the 
control variable role of participant and effect-coded it 
with -1 for lender and +1 for borrower. 
We use Airbnb.com as a case example for our 
experiment. However, using a specific example in a 
laboratory experiments may cause unintended 
influence. For example, the participants can connect to 
the case example in the experiment with positive or 
negative memories of prior experiences [12]. To control 
for the influence of prior experience we ask all 
participants whether they had ever shared or borrowed 
an accommodation via Airbnb.com. Subsequently, we 
name the control variable prior experience and effect-
coded it with -1 for no prior experience and 1 for prior 
experience with Airbnb.com. We decide to use effect-
coding, because especially for the role of participant we 
do not want to define either lender or borrower as 
reference group which would be needed when using 
dummy-coding (e.g., 0 for lender and 1 for borrower). 
In addition, mean differences on the dependent variable 
caused by an effect-coded variable can be interpreted 
with respect to the grand mean of all groups rather than 
the control group [15]. 
 
3.6. Tasks and procedures 
 
Undergraduates of two Austrian universities 
participated in our experiment. 263 participants took 
part in the experiment, which was conducted in April 
and May 2016. The participants were asked to conduct 
the experiment voluntarily in a lecture of their regular 
courses. As incentive two 25€ coupons of the online 
market place Amazon.com were raffled among all 
participants. In the course of the approximately 25 
minute long experiment the participants are asked to 
express their fairness perception along with their 
intention to share for each of the 12 treatments. 
At the beginning, all participants are randomly 
assigned to conduct the experiment either as a lender or 
as borrower (role of participant). The following 
introduction to the experiment is respecting the role 
each participant is assigned to and consists of general 
information about Airbnb.com, a clarification on the 
roles they are assigned to and general information about 
the fees charged by Airbnb.com. Then all participant are 
introduced to the provided scenario apartment in Paris. 
In a baseline treatment, the participants are asked about 
their intention to share the apartment and the maximum 
platform fee they would consider as fair. The given fee 
is used as a basis to calculate the fees in the 12 
treatments to mitigate anchoring effects as a result of an 
insufficient adjusted starting point [25] of the fee. In the 
following 12 treatments, the participants are faced by 
different manipulations of the independent variables. 
Table 2 shows four exemplified treatments with the 
visualization of the independent variables. Fee 
difference across consumer groups are visualized with 
vertical bars. The same height indicate that both fees are 
the same (e.g., treatment (A1)) and different heights 
indicate that the fee is different across consumer groups 
(e.g., treatment (B1)). Fee changes over time are 
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visualized as a horizontal corridor in which past fees 
have changed (e.g., treatment (C4)). This corridor is 
chosen in a way that past fees could have been lower or 
higher than the actual fee. Fees that have not changed 
over time are represented by a horizontal line (e.g., 
treatment (B1)). In each treatment all participants give 
their answers on fairness perception and intention to 
share. To eliminate carry-over effects, which may occur 
when participants answer multiple treatments in a row 
[6], the sequence of the treatments is randomized for 
each participant. In the end, we ask all participants if 
they ever used Airbnb.com before the experiment to 
measure our control variable prior experience. 
Additionally, the participants are asked to provide 
demographic information like gender, age, education, 
and income. 
The experiment was realized in the web-based 
software Soscisurvey.de. Before we conducted the 
experiment, we did several pre-tests to check whether 
the participants observe the manipulations and to 
eliminate problems and ambiguity [28]. 
 
 4. Analysis and results 
 
 As a first step, we perform data cleaning. In the course 
of this process we delete data from participants who 
have not finished the experiment, who have missing 
values inside their dataset, or did not correctly observe 
the manipulations. After data cleaning we end up with a 
data set of N=220 participants where 108 participants 
were acting as borrowers and 112 participants were 
acting as lenders. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
demographics of our participants. 
To test the effect of fee changes across consumer 
groups and fee changes over time on fairness perception 
Table 2. Treatment visualization 
Visualization shown in the experiment 









σown = 0 








σown = 0 








σown = 0 








σown > 0 
σtp > 0 
Table 3. Demographic data of participants 
  Gender Age Education Income 
Borrower Female 45.4% Mean (S.D.) 23.17 (2.219) Apprenticeship 6.3% No income 33.3% 
n=108 Male 54.6% Median 23 A-Levels 58.9% < 500€ 28.7% 
  Inter Sex 0% Range 20 - 32 Bachelor 27.7% 501 - 1500€ 34.3% 
          Master 3.6% 1501 - 2500€ 0.9% 
          other 2.7% 2501 -3500€ 1.9% 
          No answer 8.0% No answer 0.9% 
Lender Female 46.4% Mean (S.D.) 23.05 (2.172) Apprenticeship 2.8% No income 33.0% 
n=112 Male 52.7% Median 22 A-Levels 57.4% < 500€ 31.3% 
  Inter Sex 0.9% Range 20 - 30 Bachelor 34.3% 501 - 1500€ 32.1% 
          Master 1.9% 1501 - 2500€ 2.7% 
          other 1.0% 2501 -3500€ 0.9% 
          No answer 2.6% No answer 0% 
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we use two-way repeated measure analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with role of participant and prior experience 
as covariates. We further use Pearson’s correlation and 
regression analysis to test the effect of fairness 
perception on intention to share. For computation and 
visualization we use IBM SPSS Statistics version 24. 
 
4.1. Testing assumptions 
 
Shapiro-Wilk test reports non-normally distributed 
data p < .001. However, current research shows strong 
support for the robustness of analysis of variance under 
application of non-normally distributed data. A 
deviation of up to ± 2 for skewness and ± 6 for kurtosis 
from normally distributed data did not influence the 
results significantly [30]. The data in our dataset is 
within these boundaries.  
We use Mauchly’s test of sphericity to test whether 
the variances of the differences between different 
treatments are equal. The result shows that we need to 
correct certain degrees of freedom in the following 





The results indicate a significant main effect of fee 
differences across consumer groups on fairness 
perception F(1.742, 218) = 165.016; p < .001; 𝜂2 = .277. 
In detail, consumers perceive equality as fairest (M = 
5.390). Within-subject contrasts reveal that consumers 
do act in a self-interested way and perceive advantaged 
inequality (M = 5.075) significantly fairer than 
disadvantaged inequality (M = 3.607), F(1, 218) = 
141.751; p < .001. The mean fairness perception drops 
by 1.468; p < .001. However, despite acting self-
interested consumers perceive advantaged inequality 
significantly less fair than equality F(1, 218) = 15.197; 
p < .001. The mean fairness perception drops by .315; p 
= .001. Subsequently H1 is supported. 
The results further indicate a significant main effect 
of fee changes over time on fairness perception F(3, 
218) = 5.264; p = .001; 𝜂2 = .0028. However, within-
subject contrasts reveal that there are non-significant 
effects between advantaged dynamic vs. equally 
dynamic F(1,218) = .361; p = .554 and between equally 
stable vs. equally dynamic F(1, 218) = 1.405; p = .237. 
The effect between disadvantaged dynamic vs. equally 
dynamic remain significant F(1, 218) = 7.719; p = .006. 
Thus, consumer favor stable fees over dynamic fees. In 
more detail, consumers fairness perception is highest 
with equally stable fees (M = 4.815). However, the 
difference in mean values of equally dynamic fees (M = 
4.708), advantaged dynamic fees (M = 4.682), and 
disadvantaged dynamic fees (M = 4.558) is rather small. 
Subsequently, H2 is supported. 
When considering the interaction effect of the 
independent variables fee differences across consumer 
groups and fee changes over time, our results show a 
significant impact on fairness perception F(5.655, 218) 
= 4.080; p = .001; 𝜂2 = .0043. This indicates that 
fairness perception across different levels of fee 
changes over time is different for equality (A), 
disadvantaged inequality (B) and advantaged (C) 
inequality of fees. This can be seen in Figure 2 by the 
converging and crossing lines. Figure 2 also illustrates 
that fairness perception of disadvantaged dynamic, 
advantaged dynamic and equally dynamic fee changes 
over time behaves approximately the same across 
different levels of fee differences across consumer 















             Fee differences across consumer groups 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of fee differences across consumer groups * fee changes over time 
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perception of different levels of fee changes over time 
are approximately the same. Apart from that, consumers 
who are not faced with fee changes over time (equally 
stable) seem to be most negatively influence by 
disadvantaged inequality (B) of fees (crossing lines). 
However, within-subject contrasts show only one 
significant interaction effect when fee differences across 
consumer groups change between disadvantaged 
inequality (B) and advantaged inequality (C) and fee 
changes over time change between equally stable and 
equally dynamic fee changes over time F(1, 218) = 
5.320; p = .022. Thus, when switching from 
disadvantaged (B) to advantaged inequality (C), 
participants who are facing equally stable fees over time 
gain a higher increase in fairness perception compared 
to participants faced with equally dynamic fee changes 
over time. The remaining contrasts are not significant (p 
> .05). 
The control variable role of participant has a 
significant effect on fairness perception F(1,218) = 
6.487; p = .012; 𝜂2 = .029. However, only 2.9% percent 
of total variance is caused by the control variable role of 
participant. In detail, mean fairness perception of 
lenders (N = 112; M = 4.537; SD = .881) is .312 lower 
than mean fairness perception of borrowers (N = 108; 
M = 4.849; SD = .988).  
With respect to the control variable prior experience 
we could not find a significant effect on fairness 
perception F(1,218) = 2.932; p = .088; 𝜂2 = .013. In 
detail, mean fairness perception of participants who had 
already shared or borrowed an accommodation (N = 71; 
M = 4.838; SD = .893) is not significantly different from 
those participants who had no prior experience with 
Airbnb.com (N = 149; M = 4.620; SD = .966). 
Using pearson`s correlation we find that fairness 
perception is correlated with intention to share with 
r(2640) = .560, p < .001. To examine the relation 
between fairness perception and intention to share we 
perform a linear regression. Thereby, we use the method 
of least squares to calculate the resulting regression line. 
The results show that fairness perception significantly 
predicts intention to share with an interceptor β0 = 
21.362, t(2638) = 16.779, p < .001 and a gradient β1 = 
8.841, t(2637) = 34.690, p < .001. Fairness perception 
also predicts a significant proportion of variance in 
intention to share R2 = .313; F(1,2638) = 1203.38; p < 
.001. Subsequently, an increase in fairness perception 
by one point increases intention to share by 8.841%. 
Thus, fairness perception is positively related to 
intention to share. Furthermore, fairness perception is 
able to predict a significant 31.3% of variation in 




Angerer et al. [3] proof in an analytical economic 
model that C2C sharing platforms maximize profits if 
they utilize a dynamic two-sided pricing strategy to 
balance demand and supply. Given that supply and 
demand for sharing a product or service are likely to 
vary over time, this results in fee differences across 
consumer groups and fee changes over time. When 
comparing the effect of fee differences across consumer 
groups and fee changes over time on fairness 
perception, we find that the effect size of fee differences 
across consumer groups (𝜂2 =  .277) is much stronger 
compared to the effect size of fee changes over time 
(𝜂2 =  .0028). This implies that consumers in the 
sharing economy judge fairness predominantly by 
comparing their own platform fees with the platform 
fees of the transaction partner and, contrary to the 
findings in extant literature on fairness perception for 
one-sided pricing models [14, 22], different fees of prior 
consumers only have a subordinate effect on consumers’ 
fairness perception in the sharing economy. 
Our results also show a significant positive relation 
between fairness perception and intention to share 
which is in line with findings of extant literature where 
a positive relation between fairness perception and 
purchase intention is supported [5, 13, 19, 33, 34]. More 
interesting, we found that a significant part (31.3%) of 
variance in consumers’ intention to share (consumer 
behavior) is attributable to fairness perception. This 
Table 4. Results summary 
Independent Variables 
Source SS df MS F p-value Partial 𝜂2 𝜂2 
f 1476.955 1.742+ 847.818 165.016 ≤.001* .432 .277 
σ 14.809 3 4.936 5.264 ≤.001* 0.024 .0280 
f*σ 22.73 5.655+ 4.027 4.080 ≤.001* .018 .0043 
Control Variables 
r 5.626 1 5.626 6.487 .012* .0012 .029 
a 2.543 1 2.543 2.932 .088 .0006 .013 
f   fee differences across consumer groups 
σ  fee changes over time 
r   role of participant  
a  prior experience with Airbnb 
*      Significant with p < 𝛼 = 0.05 
+      Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
SS    Sum of Squares 
df     degree of freedom 
MS   mean Squares 
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implies that consumers in the sharing economy do not 
strictly adopt the behavior of pure economic agents 
(homo economicus) with complete rationality but are 
also influenced by behavioral factors such as perceived 
fairness (cf., [19]).  
Our analysis of the control variable role of 
participant reveals that the mean fairness perception of 
lenders is slightly lower than mean fairness perception 
of borrowers. According to equity theory, one reason for 
this might be that lenders perceive the reward of the 
matchmaking service slightly lower than borrowers. 
However, this difference is not substantial which 
supports our implicit assumption that the reward from 
using the matchmaking service is similar for lenders and 
borrowers. 
 
5.1. Managerial implications 
 
If a C2C sharing platform utilizes dynamic two-
sided pricing and subsequently adjust its fees, it will 
either disadvantage borrowers over lenders (left side of 
Figure 3) or disadvantage lenders over borrowers (right 
side of Figure 3).  
Expressed in numbers, fee differences between 
lenders and borrowers of 20% decrease mean fairness 
perception of the disadvantaged group by 1.783 and 
intention to share by approximately 25% compared to 
equal fees between both consumer groups. At the same 
time, fairness perception of the advantaged group 
decreases by only .315 and associated intention to share 
decreases by 2.8%. This illustrates that fairness 
perception and intention to share of the disadvantaged 
group decreases below fairness perception and intention 
to share of the advantaged group. This leads to an 
imbalance of demand and supply even if a C2C sharing 
platform applies a dynamic two-sided platform pricing 
strategy and considers the economic effects described in 
Angerer et al. [3]. Subsequently, a C2C sharing platform 
has to be aware of the tradeoff between the positive 
economic effect and the negative fairness effect when 
utilizing a dynamic two-sided platform pricing strategy. 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
 
The participants of this study were students of two 
Austrian universities. This may not sufficiently 
represent the user group of Airbnb.com especially with 
respect to demographic diversity of the participants. It 
may be useful to conduct a similar study outside the 
scope of the university to reveal potential differences. 
We find that fairness perception is able to predict 
approximately 31.3% of variance in intention to share. 
In future research it may be interesting to hypothesize 
and test other factors that may influence intention to 
share. This may lead to a more complete explanation of 
what factors, beside fairness perception, describe 
intention to share in the sharing economy. In addition, a 
comparative analysis of the different factors may reveal 
the magnitude to which each of the factors is improving 
the prediction of intention to share. Subsequently, the 
different factors can be ranked according to their 
explanatory power towards the variance of intention to 
share. 
In this study, our hypotheses are tested in the context 
of a C2C sharing platform. To analyze if our findings 
also hold for two-sided platform business models in 
general, we plan to test the hypothesis in different 
application contexts. However, we expect that we find 




From an economic perspective, dynamic pricing 
seems to be the profit maximizing pricing strategy for 
C2C sharing platforms because it allows for balancing 
supply and demand over time. However, the influence 
of dynamic pricing on consumer behavior remain 
unstudied. Based on distributed justice and equity 
theory we set up a laboratory experiment and investigate 
the effect of two characteristics of dynamic pricing, 
namely fee differences across consumer groups and fee 
changes over time, on fairness perception of consumers 
of a C2C sharing platform and how fairness perception 
affects intention to share. We find that fee differences 
across consumer groups as well as fee changes over 
time have a negative effect on fairness perception and 
intention to share. Comparing the effect sizes, fee 
differences across consumer groups have a substantially 
stronger negative effect on fairness perception than fee 
changes over time. Especially the consumer group that 
is charged with a higher fee has a lower intention to 
share resulting from negative fairness perception. 
Consequently, C2C sharing platforms have to be aware 
of the negative effects from fairness perception when 
they implement a dynamic two-sided pricing strategy. 
Overall, C2C sharing platforms have to balance the 
 



























positive economic effect described in [3] and the 
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